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Abstract
This paper examines the effects of mergers and acquisitions on the firms
operating performances in UK from 2005-2008. The performances of
acquiring firms are compared with the control group of non-merging firms
by employing a fixed-effect model. Four performances measurements are
employed including ROA, ROCE, profit margin and cash flow ratio. There is
no significant evidence that mergers and acquisitions have impact on
companys operating performance over the whole sample. However,
significant positive effects of M&A are found in particular financial year and
in certain industries.
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11. Introduction
1.1 Background of mergers and acquisitions
Mergers and acquisitions have been happened all the time over a centurys
time and they always come in waves. The first takeover wave occurred in the
US is in 1900s and UK had the first takeover wave in 1960s. It has been
tested that takeover waves are always influenced by external business
environment changes such as the economic recessions and recovery,
regulatory changes and technical innovations. Scholars have been
interested in whether M&A activities will bring benefits to firms for decades
and developed several theories to explain why firms get involved into M&A
activities. Stigler (1950) suggested the motive behind merger wave in
1900s is that large firms are looking for monopoly power to enhance their
strength in competitions. In addition, companies are also intended to
achieve economies of scale by merging. Mergers and acquisitions in 1950s
were driven by firms intention to be more diversified and enter into new
markets unrelated to their primary business. Academic literature suggested
the takeovers occurred in US around 1980s are due to the recovery of the
economic recession and deregulation of the financial services sectors
(Martynova and Renneboog, 2008). In more recent periods of 1990s and
recent years, the globalization creates a more competitive international
business environment which stimulates the cross-border M&A activities.
Mergers and acquisitions are generally categorized into three types. Firstly,
horizontal mergers are occurred most commonly and are defined as the
combinations of two firms in the same line of business (Brealey et al, 2011).
The second type is the vertical merger which contains companies at different
stages of production. For instance, a company expands back toward the
output of the raw material and acquires its suppliers directly to reduce
2purchasing costs of materials. At last, a conglomerate merger involves
companies in totally unrelated businesses. Conglomerate mergers used to
happen most frequently around 1960s and 1970s in the US. However, this
type of mergers is less popular now.
The motivations of different types of mergers and acquisitions are developed
into several theories. To achieve economies of scale is argued as the natural
goal of horizontal mergers. Companies will take advantages of sharing
resources and reducing fixed costs through mergers. Vertical mergers are
motivated to get an expansion of vertical integration, which facilitates
coordination and administration (Brealey et al, 2011). Other motives such
as enhance market shares, improvement of management efficiency and to
achieve diversifications also influence the takeovers.
Moreover, there are a lot of previous literatures investigating whether M&A is
a value-added activity to firms through two approaches. The first one
examines the effects of M&A on shareholders wealth through discovering the
cumulative average abnormal returns around the announcement date. Most
studies testing the short-term wealth effects have found significant positive
increase of targets share prices. But the impact of M&A on the performances
of bidder firms is blurred. This approach is employed to examine long-term
wealth effects and the empirical results showed reduced firm values after
mergers. Another approach is to test the companies post-merger operating
performances by analyzing their accounting information. The empirical
results vary from different methodologies applied, time period under
investigation, accounting measurements and other factors such as the
payment methods of mergers.
1.2 Objectives and methodology of the dissertation
The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of mergers and
3acquisitions (M&A) on companys operating performances in UK for a period
between 2005 and 2008. A large panel of British listed firms is examined
across a four-year time period, including merged firms and non-merged
firms. Three profitability ratios (Return on Assets, Return on Capital
employed and Profit Margin) and one cash flows measurement are used as
the performance indicators. A fixed-effect regression model is initially built
by introducing M&A as dummy variables. Other factors which are widely
tested also having impact on companys performance are included in the
model as independent variables. The advantage of using fixed-effect model
is that it controls the differences between individual firms and controls the
time-specific factors as well. In addition, effects of M&A are also examined in
specific financial years considering the impact of M&A may vary in specific
economic environment. Furthermore, the model is extended by analyzing
M&A effects on different industries respectively and some significant M&A
effects are found in different industries by using alternative performance
measurements.
1.3 Organization of the dissertation
This paper is divided into four parts. The first part is an overview of the
previous literatures on the motives of mergers and acquisitions, and the
empirical evidences of M&A effects on companys performances by applying
either event study or accounting measurements. The advantages and
drawbacks of using the two methodologies are also discussed. In this paper,
the second approach of using accounting information to examine the
performance is employed. The next part describes how the sample data are
collected and the designs of the empirical study. For the third part, the
empirical results are represented, interpreted and discussed for using
different accounting measurements and in different industries. Finally, there
are no significant results indicating that mergers and acquisitions attribute
4to the firms performance improvements overall but significant effects are
found in different industries.
52. Literature Review
2.1 Motives for mergers and acquisitions
The motives for mergers and acquisitions are being studied and investigated
by many previous studies. (Andrade et al. 2001) summarized the reasons of
a company get involved in a takeover activity as follows, efficiency-related
reasons that often involve economies of scale or other synergies; attempts
to create market power, perhaps by forming monopolies or oligopolies;
market discipline, as in the case of the removal of incompetent target
management; self-serving attempts by acquirer management to
over-expand and other agency costs; and to take advantage of opportunities
for diversification, like by exploiting internal capital markets and managing
risk for undiversified managers. Furthermore, hubris theory developed by
Roll (1986) and cash flow theory also explained the reasons of mergers in
different perspectives.
2.1.1 The Synergy Theory
The synergy theory suggests the value of the combined firms is greater than
the sum of the values of two individual firms (Bradley et al., 1988; Sech,
1990). And the takeovers only happen when the shareholders of both target
and acquirer gained values (Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1993). Empirical
studies also provided evidence of gains on values of target firm, bidding firm
and the total value of the combined firm (Berkovitch & Narayanan, 1993;
Gondhalekar & Bhagwat 2000; Bradley et al., 1983). In general, firms can
obtain synergies from the achievement of economies of scale, operating
synergy and financial synergy.
Economies of scale and scope
The economies of scale help firms achieve operating efficiency through size
(Sharma and Ho, 2002). And efficiencies from economies of scope help firms
6improving operating performances by reducing production costs. For
example, firm A may have better management skills on working capitals
than firm B. The acquisition then can improve the efficiency of working
capital management of firm B.
Operating synergy
The operating synergy can be achieved by either enhancing the revenue or
by reducing costs (Gaughan, 1999). The combined firm generates resources
such as cash flows and revenues which are much bigger than those of
individual firm itself. The costs reduction can be achieved by sharing fixed
costs through larger economic of scale. And the combined firm will generate
more efficiency through using a more efficient production line employed by
one of the individual firm.
Financial synergy
Firms can also gain financial benefits through mergers by deducting the
costs of capital. It will be cheaper for the new combined firm to access
capital market (Levy and Sarnat, 1970) According to the theory of Lewellen
(1971), the combined firms debt capacity is higher because a bidding firm
with larger debt capacity can ship its maximum debt amount to the target
that is highly leveraged or likely to be bankruptcy. Generally, target firms
leverage levels are much higher than those of bidding firms (Bruner, 1988).
Debt capacity is defined as the maximum amount that a firm is able to
borrow. Empirical evidence support this theory that the post-merger actual
debt ratios are significantly higher than the potential theoretical ratios
Rathinasamy et al (1991). The combined firm can also generate benefit from
the declining tax fees. Firms can use operating losses to reduce tax fees. In
addition, firms can benefit from saving transaction costs and using internal
funds instead of using out sources.
72.1.2 Increase of Market Share
Mergers and acquisitions are also motivated by firms willingness to grow,
expand its market share and obtain more market power. Firms tend to
enhance its market power by gaining monopoly and monopsony power
(Porter, 1980). Monopoly is a situation in which the firm dominant a certain
market and is capable to control the prices of the product or service.
Because the firm has the power of controlling prices, it can increase the price
to very high and force customers to accept the prices. If a firm gained its
monopoly power, it then can obtain more revenues due to high prices.
Monopsony power refers to the firms ability to lower the prices that
suppliers offer (Sharma and Ho, 2002). The firms then can deduct the costs
of purchasing materials and hence increase its profit margin.
Horizontal mergers help firms gain competitive advantages through
acquiring rivals in the same industry. However, it is found that not only the
bidding firms benefit from the merger, all the firms returns enhanced from
it. Eckbo (1983) examined a large number of firms in mining and
manufacturing industries and found that competitors earned significant
abnormal return around the announcement date. Therefore, the mergers
benefit the merging firms and their competitors at the same time.
Furthermore, firms have a better way generating unique and specialized
resources through mergers and acquisitions and reduced the costs to enter
a new market (Seth et al., 2002). Merging is a more efficient way for a
company willing to enter a new market instead of establishing a new one.
Since the target firm already has certain knowledge about the new market
and has particular techniques as well as established relationship with
suppliers and customers, the acquirer firm will get into the market in a
cheaper way.
82.1.3 Improved Management
Jensen (1984), have argued that the large premia received by corporate
shareholders derive from the improved management and increased
efficiency brought about by restructuring .The improvement of managerial
efficiency can be approached in two perspectives. On one hand, targets
management efficiency will be improved since the acquirer firm generally
operates better. This is inconsistent with the fact that the acquirer is usually
larger than the target firm and operates in a more sophisticated business
environment. Managers of a well-performed acquirer have more successful
experiences on running the business and managing resources. For instance,
a target firms negative operating performance may due to poor
management. A greater degree of managerial skills from acquirer will help
improve the targets performance. On the other hand, managers from
acquirer firms are monitored by potential bidders (Jenson & Ruback, 1983).
The managers of acquirer will then try to improve operating efficiency and to
avoid of dismissal after M & A and minimize non-value maximizing behavior
(Manne, 1965).
2.1.4 Diversification
Firms also merge for the purpose of achieving a higher level of diversification
(Levy and Sarnat, 1970) exhibited that diversification of unrelated business
can reduce the systematic risk which represents the sensitivity of a firms
returns to the aggregate returns of the market place. Chatterjee (1990)
concluded conglomerate mergers are motivated by diversification between
firms whose businesses are essentially unrelated. Firms with a purpose of
entering a new market tend to take a vertical takeover for the benefits of
diversification.
2.1.5 The Agency Theory
Berkovitch and Narayanan(1993) claimed that mergers and acquisitions are
9likely to be a result of agency problem. Some of the mergers are taken
places because acquirers managers pursue their own welfare rather than
the interest of the company as a whole. Therefore, the managers may prefer
taking acquisitions despite of the decrease of firms total value. If the
shareholders capture the motives of acquires management, they gained the
barging power and can use it to obtain more values. The higher the agency
problem is, the more value target shareholders will gain. However, the
agency problem decreases the firms total value. This explains the reason
mergers and acquisitions have a negative impact on the post-merger
performances. However, Sharma and Ho (2002) suggest the agency
problem may lead to positive post-merger performance. Their arguments
based on Jensens (1986) theory that managers tend to invest free cash flow
in negative net present value projects. They suggest takeovers paid by cash
have better post-merger performance because the reduction of cash limits
the possibility that managers misuse free cash flows.
2.1.6 Hubris Theory
Hubris hypothesis describes a situation where an the bidding firm paid much
more than the targets actual economic value due to the over-optimistic
estimation of the target firms value by the bidding firms managers. In other
words, the bidding firm made an overpayment in the takeover. Roll (1986)
assumed that if there were no synergy gains in the takeover and there were
no value in the takeover. The increase of a target firms share price is simply
transferred from the bidding firm. And the takeover premium is extra value
bidding firm paid than the real economic value of corporate combination.
Academic studies have been examining the impact of mergers and
acquisitions on the performances of firms for decades and the results are
mixed. There are two main approaches to examine the effects of takeovers,
through analyzing stock market returns and examining companies
10
long-term financial performances.
2.2 Empirical evidence
2.2.1 Empirical evidence based on event study
The most widely used approach is to evaluate M&As impact on shareholders
wealth and it is considered as the event study. The basic theory behind
event study is that it assumes the announcements of M&A will have an
impact on an efficient stock market because it reveals some new information
to the market (Fama et al. 1969; Martynova and Renneboog, 2008). An
abnormal return, calculated as the differences between realized return and
an expected return, will occur due to investors expectations about the firms
prospects. Even study can not only used on testing the short-term
shareholders wealth but also on long-term shareholders wealth. This
method has some drawbacks especially when using it as a long-term
shareholders examination. First of all, it relies on the assumption that the
capital market is efficient. Healey et al. (1992) argued the gained equity
value could be the result of either real economic gains or the capital markets
inefficiencies. The bidders may overestimate the targets value and pay a
higher premium due to the markets misleading. And the investors may also
tend to overestimate the potential increase of the merged firms. Second, the
effect of takeovers will be diluted by a mega of other factors such as
changing of financial market, developing strategies and management etc
(Martynova and Renneboog, 2008). Finally, problems of using different
asset pricing models and statistical problems will occur (Barner and Lyon,
1997).
The results from short-term wealth effects indicate that most targets
shareholders are benefit from takeovers. Cumulative average abnormal
11
returns (CAARs) around are found increased significantly on the
announcement day and subsequent day (Eckbo and Langohr, 1989). Some
studies extend the period around the announcement date to twenty days
and also found significant higher abnormal returns (Bradley, 1980; Bradley
and Jarrell, 1980; Asquith et al., 1983; Chatterjee, 1992; Franks and Mayer,
1996 et al.) However, on the contrary, shareholders returns of bidding firms
are very small or even negative (Asquith, 1983; Eckbo, 1983; Morck et al,
1990 e; Raj and Uddin, 2012 et al). Studies using different time windows
and examining mergers in different time periods have different conclusions.
Therefore, there are no conclusion that shareholders of the bidding
companies earn a significant positive CAARs prior to and at the
announcement of a takeover.
The evidence of M&As effects on long-term shareholders wealth is contrast
to the results of short-terms. In general, studies found M&A will damage
shareholders wealth. Martynova and Renneboog (2008) compared different
studies on long-term wealth effects and summarized that studies applying
different estimation techniques result in different findings. For instance,
significantly negative cumulative average abnormal returns over three years
after announcement are found if using market model. Jesen and Ruback
(1983) suggested the reason results of long-term wealth effects are
different from those of short-term may due to methodological problems.
Considering there are a lot other factors affecting shareholders wealth in a
long-term period except the takeovers impact and the market efficiency
assumption, another branch of studies investigate the operating
performances after merging in a relatively long period to avoid the
shortcomings of event study.
2.2.2 Empirical Evidence based on operating performance
Scherer (1988) suggested that it is better to test the effect of acquisition
12
through analyzing companys probability directly. The advantage of using
accounting data is that it allows us to test directly the hypothesis in which
we are interested (Dickerson et al, 1997). However, the accounting
distortions such as changes in accounting regulations (Martynova and
Renneboog, 2008) will affect the measurement. In addition, testing the
operating performance also suffers from the choices of accounting
measurements which can be affected by managerial decisions (Healey et al,
1992; Ramaswamy and Waegelein, 2003).
Previous studies used different performance measures to investigate firms
financial performances and they lead to different conclusions. The most
commonly used performance measurements are the accrual accounting
treatments and cash flow adjusted measurements.
Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) studied the performances of 471 firms who
involved in mergers and acquisitions from 1950 to 1977 in US, using Line of
Business data supplied by the Federal Trade Commission. The data was
collected by business segments. They use three different accounting
measurements to examine firms performances, including the ratios of
operating income to the end year assets, operating income to sales and cash
flows to sales. The M&A activity is measured by a merger variable which is
calculated as the original value of assets divided by the end of merger year
assets and another two dummy variables of mergers. Other variables are
held in consistence and it further controls the impact of industry, market
share and accounting method choices. The results showed that the target
firms have negative performance improvements after acquisitions and on
average the acquisitions did not generate synergy or improve the
performance of acquired firms neither. However, the results are questioned
because of the mismatch of the examined performance accounting years
and merger years.
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In UK, Chatterjee and Meeks (1996) have tested the impact of alternative
accounting treatments on the post-merger performance when using the
accounting evaluation. They examined the post-merger performances of
British companies during 1977 to 1990. In year 1984, the accounting regime
was introduced. The results showed that there were no significant
performance improvement before year 1984 but positive performance
improvements were found after 1984.
Dickerson et al. (1997) also studied the impact of M&A as well as the effects
of internal growth on companys operating performances of British firms.
They generated a large panel data of British M&A deals over the period 1948
to 1977 and by comparing the post-merger performances between merged
firms and non-merged firms. The fixed effect model is employed. M&A is
introduced as a dummy variable and time-series and cross-section
dimensions are controlled by the model. The main advantage of using fixed
model is that it controls the individual-specific effects among a large amount
of firms. They concluded that mergers and acquisitions do not have a
positive impact on companies performances but destroy the value of the
firm. They also suggested the internal growth would bring more benefit to
the company rather than mergers and acquisitions.
Gugler et al (2003) analyzed the effects of mergers around the world from
1981 to 1998. They examined the performances using profit and sales as the
measurements and choosing non-merged firms from the same industry as
the benchmark group. Their results show the average profitability of merged
firms is significantly higher than that of non-merged firms. While, the
average sales of M&A firms is lower comparing with the benchmark group.
The increased profits for merged firms are suggested due to increasing of
market power and operating efficiency. This result is consistent with
Muellers (1997) finding that merged firms in the manufacturing industry
14
decreased in market share and enhances market power.
Healey et. al.(1992) had a totally opposite conclusion of improved argued
that using accounting data has drawbacks that they can be affected by
applying different accounting methods and be influenced by the managerial
decisions. The cash flows measurements, otherwise, will represent the
actual economic benefits better. This is because cash flows will not be
affected by factors such as depreciation, goodwill, interest expense and
income taxes etc. Therefore, they used cash flow measurements to examine
50 largest U.S. mergers between 1979 and mid-1984 and concluded that
mergers lead to higher operating cash flow returns and had significant
positive impact on firms performance.
There are a few studies following Healeys study using cash flows as
operating performance measurements. Most of the following studies
adopting operating cash flows measurement found performance
improvements after acquisitions. In UK, Mason et al (2000) studied 44
takeovers in the period of 1985 to 1987. They used the cash flow based
measures and found the operating performance increased after takeovers.
In US, both Linn and Switzer (2001) and Ramaswamy and Waegelein (2003)
following the study of Healey et al (1992), using industry-adjusted operating
cash flows divided by the market value of assets as the performance
measurement and a cross-sectional regression model. Both of them found
significant evidence for positive post-acquisition performance
improvements. Moreover, Linn and Switzer (2001) found transactions paid
by cash generally performed better than those paid by stock. Other factors
such as the size of combining firms, long-term performance plans are also
tested being associated with post-merger performances by Ramaswamy and
Waegelein (2003). But they did not find significant evidence for the impact
of transactions payment types.
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Nevertheless, not all the studies using cash flows measurement have
positive results. Ghosh (2001) studied 315 firms post-acquisition
performances in the US between 1981 and 1995. Operating performance
measurement such as cash flow returns divided by assets, cash flow
margins are used. However, by using firms matched on performance and
size as a benchmark, he didnt find positive performance improvements
after takeovers and he also found that the cash flows increase significantly
following acquisitions that are made with cash, but decline for stock
acquisitions.
The impact of methodological improvements and the selection of
appropriate benchmarks are concerned would influence the results of
post-merger operating performances. Two common methodologies are
employed to test the performance improvements by previous studies. The
first one used by Healey et. al.(1992) is the regression-based methodology
and the second one is developed by Ghosh (2001), who argued the
regression-based model might be biased because the negligence of acquirer
firms superior pre-merger performances. Ghosh(2001) uses a change
model, comparing post-merger performance with some pro forma combined
target and acquirer pre-performance measure.
Another issue the scholars concerned is how to choose the benchmark.
Gregor et. al.(2001) argue that it is crucial to choose the appropriate
expected performance benchmark. They state simply using the same firms
pre-merger performance will be unsatisfying if the merger transaction
comes in response to an industry shock that changes the prospects for a
meaningful fraction of the firms in the industry. Healey et.al. (1992) choose
the industry-based benchmark can overcome the problems caused by
industry shocks. The abnormal industry-adjusted performance they used is
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measured as the intercept of a cross-sectional regression of post- merger
industry-adjusted cash flow returns corresponding to premerger returns.
But Gregor et. al. (2001) also claimed controlling for industry may not be
sufficient to account for all cross-sectional correlation. In addition, Ghosh
argued the industry-median adjusted performance measurement could be
biased because the acquiring firms are normally larger in size and perform
better than the industry average and their performances tend to be
outstanding during the takeover periods (Franks and Harris, 1989 and Morck
et al, 1990).
However, the result from Ghosh(2001) that using benchmark controlling for
size and pre-merger performances will be more appropriate than using the
industry-adjusted benchmark employed by Healey et. al. (1992) is difficult
to be approved because Ghosh (2001) does not use a regression model as
Healey et. al. (1992) used. For a further study, Powell and Stark (2004)
examined this issue by investigating 191 takeovers in UK between 1985 and
1993. By using alternative operating performance measurements, deflator
choices, performance benchmarks and methodologies, they concluded that
firstly, the post-merger performances are affected by different
methodologies adapted. Higher improvements are found by using
regression-based model than using a change model. Second, using accruals
operating performance measures lead to better post-merger performances
compared to using a pure operating cash flow measure. Third, there is no
significant difference between the results by using the industry-adjusted
benchmark and by a benchmark that controls firms size and
pre-performances. Fourth, the deflator used has an impact on the results,
especially when the regression-based methodology is used. And finally, they
found little consistent evidence that mergers payment type and firm size
have effects on the performance after acquisition.
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A lot of studies also have more widely tests on other factors that may affect
M&A firms performances including the method of payment, type of
acquisitions, the purposes of mergers and the time period under
investigation. It is generally found that using cash flows as performance
measurement will result in positive effects on M&A firms performance
rather than using accrual accounting indicators (Healey et al, 1992; Linn and
Switzer,2001). Ravenscraft and Scherer (1988) found acquisitions among
related business have significant improvements in their performances than
horizontal mergers and horizontal mergers have better performance than
vertical ones. On the contrary, Ramaswamy and Waegelein (2003)
concluded acquiring firms in dissimilar industries are more profitable after
merger. Similar results are also found in the branch of event study. Mueller
(1985) also found mergers in non-related industries (conglomerate mergers)
bare a loss of market shares. The payment types of takeovers are also
considered affect the M&A activities. Most of studies found takeovers paid by
cash have significant better performances than those acquired totally by
equity (Ghosh, 2001; Carline et al, 2002). Moreover, hostile mergers are
found bring damage on shareholders wealth due to the payment of a higher
premium through event study branch (Franks and Mayer, 1996).
18
3. Data and Empirical design
3.1 Data
The empirical research is designed to analysis mergers and acquisitions in
Britain using the financial analysis method. Due to the limited resources of
financial data available, the research period is narrowed down to 4 years
from year 2005 to year 2008.
The first database collected is the balance sheet data of British firms. It is
obtained from FAME, which is produced by Bureau van Dijk (BvD), contains
comprehensive financial information on companies in the UK and Ireland. I
chose the firms from the major industries and exclude firms in financial
sectors, public administrations, health and education sectors due to their
special accounting and regulatory requirements which make them difficult to
compare from other firms. I then filtered the data to relatively large firms
whose turnovers in those five years are larger than 10,000 th GBP. A total
number of 23,794 firms are generated. The required financial information
used for calculating ROA and the size of firms such as the fixed assets,
current assets, earnings before interest and tax and a variety of financial
ratios in the period 2005-2008 are collected. Because there is a lagged value
of profitability in the regression model, statement of 2004 is also obtained.
The balance sheet data for all firms in FAME are available from year 2004.
Thus, research period is narrowed.
The second database is the mergers and acquisitions (M&As) database of
British firms over the period 1997-2008 from Zephyr which is also produced
by Bureau van Dijk (BvD). It contains comprehensive information on M&A,
IPO, private equity and venture capital deals all over the world. Compared to
other financial database such as Thompson One, Bloomberg, it is more
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convenient to merge with the first database by same firms BvD ID numbers.
The criterion of selecting a merger is that the acquiring firm acquired more
than 50% of the equity of a target firm. It includes the names of acquiring
and targets firms, the ID numbers, the countries and year in which mergers
completed. Because of the limited firm financial information, the time period
of M&A is narrowed down to 2005-2008. After omitting the duplicates by the
Deal Number, there are 1447 merger deals during this time period. A few
firms acquired more than once in an accounting year. Considering the
pervious successful merger makes the acquiring firm more likely to get
involved in a chain of mergers and hence the results will be biased
(Ramaswamy and Waegelein, 2003) Therefore, I only take a firms first
merger in the accounting year into the data.
I then combined the balance sheet database of 15,170 firms with the M&A
database of 1,447 firms together by firms BvD ID Number. Out of 1,447
acquiring firms there are 224 firms matched with the balance sheet data. A
large number of firms in M&A database are not matched because a large
portion of mergers is among financial institutions. Also, smaller mergers are
also excluded. The non-merged 14,946 firms from FAME database is then
used as the control sample.
Graph 1 Summary of M&A by industries 2005-2008
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Graph 1 exhibits mergers activities in the main industries from 2005 to 2008
in different industries. M&A activities in the wholesale and retail sector are
the most actively. There are about 50 firms in this industry are get involved
in M&A during 4 years and they take around 20% of the total numbers of
mergers. Machinery and equipment sector is the second largest industry
that M&A occurred where 30 mergers take places. The following four
industries where M&A occurred frequently are the chemical industry,
construction, food and beverage and transport sector. These four industries
have similar number of mergers. Table I presents more detailed information
of M&A in different industries each year. It is shown that the six industries
where M&A occurred most frequently have a total number of mergers of 163
and takes 73% of the whole mergers sample in the four years. For each
given year, there are 70 mergers in 2005, 61 in 2006, 67 in 2007 and 26 in
2008. (See Table I in Appendix)
Table 3.1 Summary statistics Panel A: Profitability of M&A firms 2005-2008
ROA ROE PM
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
t-1 0.141632 0.733948 0.264510 0.582689 0.053152 0.102712
t 0.081016 0.117825 0.257589 0.770693 0.045601 0.110585
t+1 0.080699 0.128630 0.200211 0.674418 0.043173 0.111810
t+2 0.068885 0.135258 0.131635 0.934772 0.032930 0.123624
t+3 0.078530 0.168462 0.173419 0.542294 0.048442 0.125723
*t is the year in which M&A occurs
Table 3.1 summarizes three ratios of profitability for the 224 mergers and
acquisitions occurred between 2005 and 2008. While t is the year that
mergers happened, the table presents the mean of ROA, ROE, and PM ratios
from pre-merger year to three years after the merger. From the column of
ROA we can see, the average number of ROA the year before mergers is
around 14% and the standard deviation is 0.733948. By the following three
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years including the merger year, the profitability ratio declines continually.
The standard deviations of the post-merger years also become smaller
which reflect the change of profitability of these firms are not as fluctuate as
before. But at the third year after merger, the profitability starts rising by
around 14% from 0.068885 to 0.078530. The mean of these firms ROE also
has a falling trend after the merger. On the merger year, the mean of ROE
drops slightly and keep dropping for the following two years. But the ratio
also rises in the last year. The profit margins also follow similar trend.
Generally, the profit margins decrease in the first two post-merger years and
go up in the last year. The standard deviations are relatively small compared
to those of ROE and ROA and the ratios of PM for the firms are more stable.
Table3.2 Summary statistics Panel B: Profitability of non-merged firms 2005-2008
ROA ROE PM
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
t-1 0.224968 0.224496 0.084834 0.168262 0.014599 0.031448
t 0.282922 0.280592 0.075517 0.166251 0.013778 0.031728
t+1 0.263583 0.275223 0.067424 0.161231 0.012968 0.031094
t+2 0.250174 0.277144 0.062361 0.158896 0.012876 0.031287
t+3 0.237627 0.275173 0.041048 0.132310 0.008898 0.025351
Table 3.2 presents the profitability of the panel data of non-merged firms in
the same time range as merged firms. Some extreme big values of these
ratios are excluded hence the number of non-merged firms are reduced to
12,981 firms. The extreme values are defines as ratios bigger than 1 and
smaller than -1. The average ROA of non-merged firms increased in the year
of merger from 22.5% to 28.3%, which is contrast to the trend of merged
firms. The ratio then falls down in the following three years. While the ROE
ratios and profit margins of the non-merged firms in these years also
decrease. Because the profitability of both the merged firms and
non-merged firms decline, it is hard to tell if the decrease of merged-firms
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profitability is related to the takeovers activities. The regression is then
taken to examine whether M&A will affect the profitability of merged-firms.
3. 2 Empirical Design
3.2.1 Operating performance measurements
Generally speaking there are two main approaches to the evaluation of
post-merger performance evaluation in the previous literature, the event
study on stock market and the accounting information based evaluation. A
lot of studies using the stock market approach have shown the results that
there are positive effects of acquisitions on both the acquiring and target
firms stock prices (Bradley, 1980; Bradley and Jarrell, 1980; Franks and
Mayer, 1996 et al). However, it is argued that the increases of the combined
firms share prices may not only due to the economic gains of the takeover
activity, but also affected by the market inefficiencies such as
undervaluation and overvaluation of the combined firms by the investors
(Shiller, 1989; Healy et al. 1992). In this study, the second approach is used
by evaluating the post-merger performance using accounting data. This
approach also has its drawbacks. For example the use of creative accounting
techniques may affect the true and fair view of the published accounts
(Dickerson, 1997) or be influenced by managerial decisions (Healy, 1992).
Compare the empirical results using different performance indicators are
necessary because the choice of a merger accounting method can affect
both numerator and denominator.
Return on assets (ROA)
Return on assets is almost the most common ratio to measure the
profitability of a firm. It indicates howmuch profit a firm earned in relative to
its total assets. It reflects how efficient a firm generates profit by using its
assets. The ROA ratio is calculates as follows,
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Return is measured by the earnings before interest and tax (EBIT), as it
avoids the effects of using different accounting methods for depreciation and
amortization and tax calculation. Thus it eliminates the problem of
comparison across firms (Bertrand and Betschinger, 2012). The value of
total assets is calculated as the sum of fixed assets and current assets. Healy
et. al. (1992) used market values of total assets rather than the book values
and they argued that the market values represent the opportunity cost of
the assets and they reduced the inter-temporal and cross-sectional effects
on firms. However, the market value of the acquiring firms may be affected
positively or negatively due to the reaction of market towards the mergers
activities. An increase or reduction of the market value will then affect ROA
measurement (Sharma and Ho, 2002). In addition, since there is a large
amount of control firms, the market values of firms are limited. Hence, the
book values of total assets are used to calculate ROA.
Return on Capital Employed (ROCE)
ROCE is another useful measurement for comparison of firms profitability. It
reflects a firms ability to generate the earnings on all of the capital it
employs. A higher ROCE indicates that a firm has more profit to reinvest into
the company and helps increase earnings-per-share growth. A firm with
high ROCE is also considered as a successful growth company. By using
ROCE ratio as the profitability measurement help analyze whether M&A
activity will affect the companys growth and its ability to generate earnings
in the future.
Profit Margin
This profitability ratio measures the dollar amount of the sales that a
company actually retains in earnings. It reflects the efficiency of a firms
operating performance and how well a firm controls its costs. A problem of
using profit margin is that this ratio is more useful when comparing firms in
the same industry.
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Cash Flows Measurement
Since a lot of previous studies have found using operating cash flows
measurement will more likely lead to positive post-merger performances
(Healey et al, 1992; Mason et al, 2000; Linn and Switzer, 2001; Ramaswamy
and Waegelein , 2003 ). Cash Flow performance indicator is also used as the
independent variable in the regression model. However, operating cash
flows information in firms tends to easily missing because firms may not
bother report zero cash flows or for some other reasons. Therefore, this
measurement may be biased due to lack of enough financial information.
3.2.2 Hypothesis Testing
According to previous empirical studies, M&A activities are very likely to
have an impact on the companys operating performances. To examine
whether firms performances will change due to the influence of M&A, I am
going to use t-test to examine whether there are differences between the
mean values of merged firms and non-merged ones by applying a
Two-Group Mean Comparison Test. The hypothesizes are set up as follows,
Null hypothesis H0 ˖ There are no differences for the mean values
between merged firms and non-merged ones
Alternative hypothesis H1: Merged firms mean values are different from the
ones of non-merged firms
The confidence interval is set at 95% and the significant level is 5% which is
the figure for deciding whether to reject the null or not. In other words, if the
p-value in the output table is less than 2.5%, reject the null hypothesis; if
p-value is above 2.5%, accept the null.
The hypothesis tests are applied on the four performance indicators which
are ROA, ROCE, Profit Margin and Cash Flows Ratios. T-test results are as
25
follows,
Table 3.3 Two-Group Mean Comparison Test for Merged firms and Non-merged firms
Performance Measurements
M&A firms
(mean)
Non-MA firms
(mean)
Difference T-statistics Pr(T>t)
Return on Assets 0.0965247 0.1041682 -0.0076435 -0.0647 0.5258
Return on Capital Employed 0.2794656 0.227568 -0.0518976 -1.5574 0.9403
Profit Margin 0.0447948 0.0402551 -0.0045397 -0.8144 0.7923
Cash Flow Ratio 0.0798361 0.2502503 0.1704143 0.1137 0.4547
As it is shown in the table, the p-values of the four financial ratios are larger
than 2.5%. This result suggests that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.
Therefore, there is no conclusion that the profitability between merged firms
and non-merged firms is different.
For a more depth test on M&A impact on firms operating performance,
regression model is built to investigate the relationship between M&A and
corporate performance.
3.2.3 Independent variables
The operating performance of a firm is driven by plenty of factors. The
following factors are always considered highly related with a firms operating
performance and are used as the explanatory variables in the regression
model.
Leverage
The relationship between the leverage level and performance of a firm has
been widely tested (Kinsman and Newman, 1999; Rajan and Zingales, 1995;
Amarjit et al, 2001; Manohar and Sheri, 2005 et.al.) Most of the studies
concluded that leverage is connected with the companys performance
either positively or negatively. Therefore, the firms leverage level is
considered as a factor that influences firms operating performance. The
Gearing Ratio is used as the measure of leverage.
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Size of a firm
Firm size has been empirically found to be highly related with its profitability
(Dickerson et al 1997; Ramaswamy and Waegelein 2003). They are
corresponded with the theory of economies of scale and scope, which
indicates that a large company will in general be more profitable than a
smaller one. There are different ways to measure a firms size. In this article,
a firms size is measured as the logarithm of the firms total assets.
Mergers & Acquisitions
The impact of mergers and acquisitions on the operating performance of a
firm is estimated by introducing M&A as dummy variables. The sample is
then divided by two groups: the M&A firms and non-merger firms. Firms
involved in mergers and acquisitions activities are set to have values of 1,
therefore MA=1; Non-merged firms have values of 0, MA=0.
Furthermore, the previous profitability is also considered have impact on the
current years profitability. If the previous years profit is high, it reflects the
company is running well and this years earnings are more likely to be high.
However, including lagged independent variable will cause autocorrelation in
the fixed model (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Guglar and Yurtoglu,2004;
Bertrand and Betschinger, 2012). Therefore, lagged independent variables
of profitability are not included in this regression model.
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The formulas of financial calculations are shown in Table 3.4
Table 3.4 Formulas of key Financial Ratios
variables Formula
Return on Assets (ROA) ROA= (Earnings before Interest and Tax)/Total Assets
Return on Capital Employed
(ROCE)
ROCE= Earnings before interest and Tax (EBIT)/ (Total assets
Current Liability)
Profit Margin (PM) PM= Profit before tax/Turnover
Cash Flow Ratio CFR= Cash flow/Total assets
Net Asset Turnover (NAT) NAT= Turnover/(Total assets-current liabilities)
Gearing Ratio Gearing= (short term liabilities+ long-term
liabilities)/shareholders funds
lnSize ln (Total Assets)
The summary of the variables is presented in Table II. The panel data
includes 60,680 observations from 5,170 firms observed across a period of
four years. The variables variance in a panel data is composed by two parts,
the within variance and between variance. Within variance captures the
characters of time series variation and between variance refers to the
cross-sectional variation. One of the two components will dominate the
overall variance. For variable ROA, the overall variance is 6.870354
(2.621136^2), of which the between variance 3.910360 (1.977463^2). The
between variance is about 57% of the overall variance, which dominate the
overall variance. For ROE ratio, the two components proportions of overall
variance are similar. The effects of the cross-sectional and time-series
factors on the overall variance are almost the same. In general, most of the
variables including size of the firm, net asset turnover, solvency ratio and the
gearing level are dominated by the between variables due to the differences
across firms. In contrast, the cash flows positions are more reliable on within
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variable which reflects the variation of cash flows through years.
3.2.3 Regression models
The basic regression model estimated reflects the relationship between M&A
activity and companys operating performance is,
Yitсɲiнɴ1lnSizeitнɴ2Leverageitнɴ3M&Ait нɶtDt нɸit (1)
Where M&Ait=1 if the firm is get involved in mergers and acquisitions and
M&Ait=0 if takeovers are not undertaken. Yit is the operating performance
measurements which are presented by four measurements ROA, ROCE,
3URILW0DUJLQDQG&DVK)ORZV5DWLRĮi controls the firm specific effect and
captures the unobserved company heterogeneity. Dt are a set of time
dummies to account for time-specific factors. Since observations in the
sample are crossed years from 2005 to 2008, the business environment had
a dramatic change through years due to the financial crisis. Hence it is
necessary to control the business cycle effect through years.
For a further test on how the previous years M&A activities affect companys
performances, equation one is extended by introducing a lagged M&A factor
M&Ait-1 as independent variable.
Yitсɲiнɴ1lnSizeitнɴ2Leverageit tнɴ3M&Ait нɴ4M&Ait-1 нɶtDt нɸit (2)
Apart from the effects of M&A on companies performances, the time
dummies reflect the companies performances in specific years are varied.
For the next step, I am going to test the impact of M&A activities on firms
performances in particular financial years by using interactive dummy
variables. Four interactive dummy variables are generated by multiplying
M&A dummy with the time dummies.
Yitс ɲi н ɴ1lnSizeit н ɴ2Leverageit н ɴ3M&Ait н ɶ1 (M&A2005*D2005 ? н ɶ2
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(M&A2006*D2006 ?нɶ3 (M&A2007*D2007 ?нɶ4 (M&A2008*D2008)нɸit
Where M&A2005=1 if takeovers occurred in year2005 and M&A2005=0 if
takeovers were not undertaken. Time dummies Dt =1 if it is in financial year
t and Dt=0 otherwise. The four interactive dummies are then referring to
mergers and acquisitions happened in specific financial years.
Furthermore, Geroski(1988) and Geroski et al.(1991) argued that
profitability in UK companies is persistence by controlling for industry and
time effects. Brush, Bromiley, and Hendrick (1999) find that both
corporation and industry influence business unit profitability. In addition, the
M&A effects on company performance in specific industries are assumed to
be varied. Gugler (2003) has found dramatic differences between mergers
in manufacturing and service sectors. As analyzed in the data, six industries
have the most frequent mergers among the fourteen industries. Hence, it is
interesting to examine M&A effects on the six industries specifically.
(M&Ait×INDd) are introduced as the interaction of M&A dummies and
industrial dummies which reflect the differences of companys performance
between industries. The six industries are wholesale& retail, machinery,
chemical, construction, food &beverage and transport sectors.
Yitс ɲ н ɴ1lnSizeit н ɴ2Leverageit н ɴ3M&Ait н ɷ1 (M&Ait ? tŚŽůĞƐĂůĞ ? н ɷ2 (M&Ait*
DĂĐŚŝŶĞƌǇ ?нɷ3 (M&Ait ?ŚĞŵŝĐĂů ?нɷ4 (M&Ait ?ŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?нɷ5 (M&Ait* Food)
нɷ6 (M&Ait ?dƌĂŶƐƉŽƌƚ ?нɸit (5)
7KH FRHIILFLHQWV EHIRUH WKH LQWHUDFWLYH GXPPLHV į WKHQ FDSWXUHV WKH
differences of the M&A effects on companies performances between firms in
a specific industry and other normal firms.
The reasons to adopt the fixed effect models are as follows,
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Firstly, the dataset for the empirical analysis comprises both the time series
(5 years) and cross-sectional elements (different firms). This kind of dataset
is known as the panel data. Since the dataset including cross-sectional data,
which involve observations on economic units of varying size,
heteroskedasticity will occur. The variance of the error will no longer be
constant. In addition, the variable of profitability is autocorrelated because
the profitability in the past may affect the profitability in the next term.
Under both heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation the usual OLS estimators
are no longer minimum variance among all linear unbiased estimators. They
are not best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE) anymore (Gujarati, 2003).
There are two most commonly used models for the panel data which are the
fixed effects model and the random effects model. Although both the models
have taken the individual specific effects to the regression into consideration,
the random effects model is under the assumption that the individual
specific effects are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables while the
fixed effects model assumes individual specific effects are correlated with
the explanatory variables.
Two tests are applied to test which model should be used in the regression.
Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier is used to investigate whether the
individual effects exist. In the result p-value is zero (See Figure 1 in
Appendix), it means the data is heteroskedastic and there are individual
effects.
I also use Hausman test to examine if the individual effects are uncorrelated
with the regressors or correlated with the regressors. The result of the test
suggests the individual firm effects are correlated with the variables due to
a zero p-value. Hence a fixed effects model should be used. The results of
the tests are corresponded with the prediction that the effects of individual
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firms such as management style, corporate culture are related to the
industry and size of firms. The Hausman test shows significant differences
between the coefficients for fixed effects and random effects model.
Therefore, fixed effects model is used.
The fixed effects model can be used to control both the individual-specific
and time-invariant characteristics and solve the problem caused by the
omitted variable bias due to latent or unobserved variables (Kumar et al.
2012). The main advantages of using it is that it is assumed that all
individual differences are captured by differences in the intercept
parameters (Hill et al. 2012). It exploits within-group variation over time
and controlling for the average differences across firms in any observable or
unobservable predictors. The unobservable predictors across firms are
varied from different management quality, corporate governance to
different level of sophistication. There are two ways to estimate fixed effects
model. One is the least squares dummy variable estimator which estimates
the model by introducing an intercept dummy variable to for each individual.
Because the number of the firms is relatively large, it is difficult to apply it.
Another way to approach it is using fixed effects estimator or the
within-group estimator. In this method, the average values of both the
dependent variable and explanatory variables are calculated and then
subtracted from each original variable value, term by term. The regression
model is then formed by variables in the deviation from the mean forms. By
using this method, the coefficient estimates depend only on the variation of
the dependent and explanatory variables within individuals and thus
eliminates the impacts of different individuals (Hill et al. 2012).
However, limitations of using fixed effects model are as follows,
1. There would be endogenous variables
2. The firm specific effects may correlated with the explanatory variables
3. The presence of the lagged dependent variable causes autocorrelation
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(Dickerson, 1997)
4. It does not address the simultaneity problem (Gujarati, 2003; Kumar,
2012; Gugler, 2004).
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4.Empirical Results
Table 4.1 M&A impact on the operating performances controlling time effects
ROA ROCE PM Cash Flow Ratio
b/se b/se b/se b/se
lnSize 0.448
***
0.018
*
0.018
***
-0.006
(0.033) (0.011) (0.001) (0.004)
M&A 0.018 0.024 0.002 0.004
(0.156) (0.050) (0.007) (0.013)
NetAssetTurnover 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Gearing -0.015
*
0.008
***
-0.001
**
-0.009
***
(0.008) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001)
Year2006 -0.026 0.016
**
0.003
***
0.002
(0.023) (0.007) (0.001) (0.002)
Year2007 -0.086
***
0.002 0.004
***
-0.001
(0.024) (0.008) (0.001) (0.002)
Year2008 -0.106
***
-0.079
***
-0.009
***
-0.002
(0.024) (0.008) (0.001) (0.002)
_cons -4.196
***
0.062 -0.133
***
0.157
***
(0.319) (0.102) (0.014) (0.036)
N 60680 60680 60680 30747
rho .5319585 .3779054 .5288856 .4166133
Note: *, **, *** correspond to 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels respectively
The regression results from Table4.1 reflect how M&A impact the firms
operating performances measured by ROA, ROCE, Profit Margin and Cash
Flow Ratio respectively. The coefficients of variable M&A represent the
difference in average of the financial ratios between merged firms and
non-merged firms. For ROA as the dependent variable, the coefficient of
M&A is 0.018, controlling for other factors. It indicates that the average
profitability of M&A firms is higher than non-merged firms by 0.018.
However, the result is not significant as the p-value is very high. The
coefficients of other profitability measurements, return on capital employed
and profit margin are also positive, but none of them show significant
evidences as well. The average M&A cash flow ratio is 0.004 higher the one
of non-merged firms which shows an increasing trend, but the result is
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statistical insignificant. Rho is the proportion of variation due to individual
due to individual specific term. Large proportions are explained by individual
specific terms in ROA, Profit Margin and Cash flow ratios.
Table 4.2 M&A impact on the operating performances with previous M&A
activities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ROA ROCE Profit Margin Cash Flow Ratio
b/se b/se b/se b/se
lnSize 0.45112
***
0.01641 1.75192
***
-0.00581
(0.03353) (0.01071) (0.14975) (0.00394)
M&A at t 0.02265 0.02648 0.04613 0.00944
(0.16526) (0.05279) (0.73807) (0.01455)
Gearing -0.01482
*
0.00866
***
-0.06247
*
-0.00885
***
(0.00803) (0.00257) (0.03586) (0.00092)
M&A at (t-1) 0.00302 -0.01210 1.13877 0.00136
(0.15566) (0.04973) (0.69519) (0.01362)
year2006 -0.02276 0.00499 1.47583
**
0.00309
(0.15538) (0.04964) (0.69397) (0.01359)
year2007 -0.08402 -0.00928 1.59383
**
0.00065
(0.15629) (0.04993) (0.69802) (0.01369)
year2008 -0.10332 -0.09038
*
0.21955 -0.00047
(0.15713) (0.05020) (0.70178) (0.01378)
_cons -4.21730
***
0.08649 -14.03371
***
0.15363
***
(0.35554) (0.11359) (1.58792) (0.03876)
N 60280.000 60280.000 60280.000 30445.000
rho .5313866 .3777687 .5288366 .4148667
Note: *, **, *** correspond to 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels respectively
The coefficients of M&A (t) show similar influence on mergers activities as
Table4.1. Takeovers still show positive impact on the three profitability
measurements ROA, ROCE, profit margin and negative effects on cash flow
ratios by controlling the lagged M&A variable. For the variable lagged M&A,
the coefficient of it using ROA as profit indicator shows a very small increase
of profitability. Applying ROCE as the indicator, on the other hand, the
coefficient drops by 0.01210, controlling other factors. M&A activities also
show positive effects on both the profit margin and cash flows ratios.
However, none of these results are significant. Hence the influence of
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mergers activities on companys performance is still not obvious.
Table4.3 M&A impact on firm’s operating performances in each year from
2005-2008
ROA ROCE PM Cash Flow Ratio
b/se b/se b/se b/se
lnSize 0.449
***
0.018
*
0.018
***
-0.006
*
(0.033) (0.011) (0.001) (0.004)
NetAssetTurnover 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Gearing -0.015
*
0.008
***
-0.001
**
-0.009
***
(0.008) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001)
MA2005*year2005 -0.020 0.026 -0.016 0.026
(0.274) (0.088) (0.012) (0.024)
MA2006*year2006 -0.016 0.183
*
0.017 -0.005
(0.294) (0.094) (0.013) (0.024)
MA2007*year2007 0.003 -0.085 -0.002 0.005
(0.280) (0.090) (0.013) (0.025)
MA2008*year2008 -0.301 -0.111 0.010 0.075
*
(0.450) (0.144) (0.020) (0.039)
year2006 -0.026 0.016
**
0.003
***
0.002
(0.023) (0.007) (0.001) (0.002)
year2007 -0.087
***
0.002 0.004
***
-0.000
(0.024) (0.008) (0.001) (0.002)
year2008 -0.106
***
-0.079
***
-0.009
***
-0.002
(0.024) (0.008) (0.001) (0.002)
_cons -4.202
***
0.061 -0.133
***
0.160
***
(0.320) (0.102) (0.014) (0.036)
N 60680 60680 60680 30747
rho .532004 .377958 .528892 .416848
Note: *, **, *** correspond to 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels respectively
Table4.3 represents the impact of M&A activities on the performances of
companies in each financial year from 2005 to 2008, where MA2005 takes
value 1 if takeovers are undertaken in year 2005 and takes value 0 if there
were no mergers in 2005; year2005 takes value 1 if the financial year is
2005 and 0 for other financial years. Then the coefficients of the four
interactive dummies M&A(t)*year(t) represent the effects of takeovers on
the performances in year2005-2008 respectively.
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A significant improvement of profitability of M&A companies, measured by
return on capital employed is found in year 2006. On average, companies
involved in M&A have a higher ROCE of 0.183 than that of normal companies,
ceteris paribus. Although the other performance indicators such as ROA and
Cash Flow Ratio suggest M&A activities destroy companys performance, the
evidences are not statistically significant. The significant increase of ROCE
among M&A companies may due to a relative large rise in profit and a
decrease or relative small increase in the capital employed, which is
measured by the subtraction of total assets and current liabilities. The
reduce of capital employed can be explained by an increasing of companys
current liabilities which contain the short-term debts, account payables,
accrued liabilities and so on. Banks lending always depend on the credit
rankings. Large corporations with higher credit rankings will benefit from
larger borrowing capacity. Therefore, merged firms with higher level of
economic scale can help smaller firms reach a higher level of debt capacity
and consistent with Lewellens (1971) study. In year 2006, the UK economy
performed well. BBC news (Jan, 2007) has reported the UK economy grew
at its fastest pace in two-and-half years during the last three months of
2006. In a boom period of economy, the predictions of its future growth are
optimistic. Banks tend to lower their borrowings level and expand their
lending scale due to the positive view for companys development and
debt-paying ability. Therefore, the well performed economic environment in
2006 and higher level of current liabilities gained from takeovers will
enhance the ROCE ratios of M&A firms.
It is also interesting to see a positive significant increase on the average of
Cash Flow Ratios after M&A in 2008. Since the financial crisis in 2007-2008
has driven the global economy into a deep recession, the number of mergers
and acquisitions fell sharply from a peak time in 2007. Theoretically, M&A
activities have high possibilities not creating values to the firms but
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destroying their values. On one hand, the results in the table present
negative impacts of M&A on both ROA and ROCE ratios but they are not
significant shown. On the other hand, the performances measured by cash
flows ratios are improved. It is also noticed that M&A in 2008 are mostly
merged by cash. From the National Statistical Report (2011), 3491 out of
4545 takeovers were paid by cash, occupied 77% proportion of the total
sample. A lot of previous literatures have tested the influences of payment
type of takeovers on companys value and most of them concluded mergers
paid by cash are more profitable than the ones merged by all-equity (Ghosh,
2001; Andrade et al, 2001, and Goergen and Renneboog, 2004). And the
finding of increased cash flows performance may highly affected by
takeovers paid by cash.
Table4.4 M&A impact on firm’s operating performances in specific industries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ROA ROCE PM Cash Flow Ratio
b/se b/se b/se b/se
lnSize -0.05052
***
-0.00969
***
0.01541
***
-0.00135
**
(0.00719) (0.00203) (0.00033) (0.00064)
M&A 0.09117 -0.00303 -0.03568
***
-0.04523
***
(0.23490) (0.06621) (0.01089) (0.01663)
Gearing -0.00473 0.01405
***
-0.00339
***
-0.00583
***
(0.00674) (0.00190) (0.00031) (0.00059)
M&A*Wholesale -0.04762 0.17648
*
0.01832 0.03315
(0.33491) (0.09440) (0.01553) (0.02317)
M&A*Machinery -0.00603 0.05889 0.06728
***
0.07800
***
(0.40488) (0.11412) (0.01878) (0.02790)
M&A*Chemicals -0.03563 -0.01535 0.04988
**
0.04235
(0.43241) (0.12188) (0.02005) (0.03318)
M&A*Construction -0.01509 -0.06858 0.03514
*
0.02091
(0.45188) (0.12737) (0.02096) (0.03142)
M&A*Food -0.03497 0.04501 0.00916 0.06775
*
(0.44497) (0.12542) (0.02063) (0.03484)
M&A*Transport -0.03170 0.01873 -0.00283 0.04356
(0.46328) (0.13058) (0.02148) (0.04837)
year06 0.01657 0.01896
**
0.00349
**
0.00009
(0.03010) (0.00848) (0.00140) (0.00232)
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year07 0.00812 0.00739 0.00462
***
-0.00384
*
(0.03014) (0.00850) (0.00140) (0.00232)
year08 0.01938 -0.07194
***
-0.00913
***
-0.00538
**
(0.03019) (0.00851) (0.00140) (0.00233)
_cons 0.58149
***
0.31848
***
-0.10572
***
0.11256
***
(0.07167) (0.02020) (0.00332) (0.00615)
N 60680 60680 60680 30747
Note: *, **, *** correspond to 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels respectively
As it is shown in Table4.4, there are some significant effects of M&A on
companys performance measuring by different financial indicators in some
specific industries. The results are interpreted by analyzing results from the
six industries and comparing results from using different measurements.
Wholesale and Retail sector
Overall speaking, M&A activities have a negative impact on the average of
companys ROA ratio and positive impacts on all other three financial ratios,
return on capital employed, profit margin and cash flows ratio. Apart from
the significant effect on M&A average ROCE, M&A impact on other financial
ratios are insignificant. The coefficient of variable M&A*Wholesale reflects
the difference between M&A firms profitability in wholesale industry and
that of other normal firms, which is a positive 0.17648, ceteris paribus.
Compared to the other three measurements, return on capital employed is
more suitable for the wholesale and retail industry. ROCE is calculated as
earnings before interests and taxes divided by the subtraction of total assets
and current liability. One of the characteristics of the firms in retail industry
is that they have relatively larger current liabilities. A high level of trade
payables is remained especially when the customers paying by credit cards.
Due to this character, firms in wholesale and retail industry are more
sensitive to the change of ROCE rather than ROA.
The outperformance of M&A firms in wholesale and retail industry is
39
correspondence with companies motives of gaining larger economic scale.
In this industry with the largest amount of M&A activities, small retailers
have been difficult to survive during a depressed business environment and
relatively larger firms seek for growth and expand as well as new ways to do
the business.
Machinery, Chemicals and Construction sectors
Machinery, chemicals and construction industries are closely connected and
they share some similar characteristics. The construction industry is one of
the major markets of both chemicals and machinery industries. Compared
to the retail and wholesale industry, these industries have relatively high
fixed costs in respect of large amount of fixed assets. For example, the more
buildings and machines the company has the higher depreciations it will
produce. Larger fixed costs will then reduce total profits.
As it is shown in Table4.4, significant positive effects of M&A are found in
machinery, chemical sector as well as the construction industry. For firms in
machinery industry, the average profit margin of M&A companies is 0.06728
higher than that of normal companies in the base group, controlling for other
factors. At the same time, the increase of average cash flow ratio of M&A
firms is bigger in comparison with the profit margin significantly.
In sum, M&A activities impact companys profit margin in machinery,
chemicals and construction sectors positively. The profit margin is calculated
as earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) divided by the turnovers. EBIT
here equals to the total revenue deducted by the sum of cost of good sales,
operating expenses and depreciation. The positive effects of M&A are
corresponding to the synergy theory that M&A activities help companies
reduce costs. Guglers (2003) findings also show that the profits of merging
firms are higher while their sales are decreased.
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Delaney and Wamuziri (2001) also investigated mergers and acquisitions
activities in the construction industry in UK for a 5-year period from 1995 to
1999. They suggested that M&A firms in construction industry are benefit
from enhancing the economic scale and reduced the costs. Other factors
also stimulate mergers in construction industry such as a more and more
restrict control of credit management and lending in bank industry and a
lack of market interest in constructors. Small firms are struggling to survive
in a more difficult environment due to these factors. This leads them to sell
to obtain more capital and borrowing capacities.
Chemical industry has relatively large amount of M&A deals and the M&A
firms outperformed other firms. According to the OECD (2012), annual
global chemical sales have doubled over the period from 2000 to 2009, the
demand of chemical products are constantly growing. Moreover, with more
concerns about the global warming, there is a higher demand of
environment friendly materials and innovative technologies are required to
develop in chemistry industry. Chemical companies can obtain new
technologies by acquiring innovative firms who have not enough capitals to
growth.
Food and Beverage sector
It is also found the M&A companies have better performance measuring by
cash flows ratio than the non-merged ones. The increase of average cash
flows is 0.06775 between merged firms and non-merged firms, ceteris
paribus. This result is consistent with the findings of previous literatures
where use the cash flow ratios as the performance indicator (Healey et al
1992; Mason et al, 2000; Ghosh, 2001).
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5.Conclusion, limitations and further recommendations
5.1 Conclusion
This study examined the impact of mergers and acquisitions on companys
operating performances for British listed firms from 2005 to 2008. A large
panel data of 15,170 companies in UK are used as the sample and 224
companies were involved in mergers. The fixed-effects regression model is
employed to test differences of operating performances among the merged
and non-merged firms by controlling firm-specified effects and time-specific
factors. Operating performance indicators return on total assets, return on
capital employed, profit margins and cash flows ratios are employed as the
dependent variables in the models. The original fixed-effect model is
extended to test how M&A activities affect the operating performances in
particular years and in certain industries and the findings are mixed.
The results from previous studies are also mixed. Studies investigate
companys post-merger performances in different countries using various
performances and methodologies. Some studies in the US found M&A
destroy companys performance significantly. Mueller (1980) employed ROE,
ROA as performance measurements and found negative impact of M&A on
companys performance. Similar results are found by Ravenscraft and
Scherer (1987) in US and Dickerson et al (1997) in UK. However, this studys
finding of overall impact of M&A on companys performance is inconsistent
with them. The result in this paper suggests that M&A activities do not make
big differences to companies significantly and it consistent with the study of
Sharma and Ho (2002). In addition, significant improvements of
post-merger performances were found in certain industries such as the
wholesale and retail industry, machinery and construction industry. The
inconsistency of results may due to the use of various accounting
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measurements.
Healey et al (1992) and some other previous studies found significant
improvements of cash flows ratios of M&A firms. However, in this paper
there is no evidence that mergers have a significant positive impact on cash
flows. But in a particular year 2008 the cash flow ratios increased
dramatically. The reason behind this obvious change may because that most
of the deals are paid by cash. In addition, in food and beverage industry,
there is a significant improvement of cash flow ratios. However, the results
are always varied in respect of using different performance measurements.
5.2 Limitations and further recommendations
First of all, the data of this study is limited to a time range of four years
because of the availability of financial data. There are a lot smaller or private
mergers deals dropped for when merge the financial dataset and mergers
dataset together. This study is only limited to examine the performances of
acquiring firms.
Secondly, the choices of account measurements will affect the results of
post-merger performances. As previous studies shown, using accrual
accounting performance measurements such as ROA, ROE can get negative
results of post-merger performance while using cash flows measurements
may have positive ones. Also, there can be different definitions for one
accounting measurement for certain terms. For instance, the return on
capital employed can be defined as the total assets or as the subtraction of
total assets minus current liabilities. The existence of different
interpretations for an accounting term makes it hard to compare the results
using alternative terms. Moreover, companys performances are affected by
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so many other factors rather than the limited factors defined in this study, as
the management style, employees satisfaction and so on.
Furthermore, using fixe-effect model has some drawbacks. It cannot avoid
endogenous variables and if the lagged profitability is involved there will be
autocorrelation. The GMM model developed by Arellano and Bond (1991)
can fix some of the drawbacks. Gular and Yurtoglu (2004) claimed the
advantages of using GMM estimator, as this estimator eliminates firm
effects by first-differencing as well as controls for possible endogeneity of
current explanatory variables. Endogenous variables lagged two or more
periods will be valid instruments provided there is no second-order
autocorrelation in the first-differenced idiosyncratic error terms.
Further studies can also investigate other factors which will influence the
post-merger performances such as the types of mergers, whether it is
horizontal, vertical or conglomerate merger; whether it is merged bay cash,
stock or mixed of the two and so on. The time period under investigation can
also be extended and more merger deals can be included to test
post-merger performances.
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Appendix
Table I. Sample composition: number of mergers from 2005 to 2008
Year in which M&A was completed
Industries 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total
Chemicals, rubber, plastics, non-mental 4 3 10 3 20
Construction 4 4 10 1 19
Food, beverages, tobacco 11 2 7 3 23
Gas, Water, Electricity 1 2 1 0 4
Hotels & restaurants 5 4 1 1 11
Machinery, equipment, furniture 11 8 8 3 30
Metals & metal products 6 2 2 1 11
Post and telecommunication 0 5 4 2 11
Primary Sector (agriculture, mining etc.) 3 2 1 1 7
Publishing, printing 2 7 3 0 12
Textiles, wearing apparel leather 2 0 1 0 3
Transport 4 8 5 2 19
Wholesale & retail trade 16 13 14 9 52
Wood, cork, paper 1 1 0 0 2
Total 70 61 67 26 224
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Table II. Summary of variables
Variable variance Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
ROA overall 0.096587 2.621136 -436 254 N = 60680
between 1.977463 -108.7687 202.5 n = 15170
within 1.720520 -327.1347 109.832 T = 4
ROE overall 0.227993 0.739842 -9.969 9.8938 N = 60680
between 0.493706 -3.35265 6.217925 n = 15170
within 0.551028 -8.025457 7.672443 T = 4
Profit Margin overall 0.040292 0.123756 -0.9983 1 N = 60680
between 0.096661 -0.618625 0.87745 n = 15170
within 0.077284 -1.020858 0.9388922 T = 4
Cash Flow Ratio overall 0.12632 17.81893 -76.74689 4379 N = 60680
between 8.909733 -19.19104 1094.796 n = 15170
within 15.43162 -1094.67 3284.33 T = 4
lnSize overall 9.72927 1.496932 0 18.86649 N = 60680
between 1.474051 0 18.62614 n = 15170
within 0.260932 3.386466 14.47518 T = 4
Net Asset Turnover overall 6.953479 26.29905 0 982.35 N = 60680
between 19.42065 0 831.6275 n = 15170
within 17.73407 -391.714 739.7635 T = 4
Gearing overall 1.057348 1.590419 0 9.9865 N = 60680
between 1.225550 0 9.35805 n = 15170
within 1.013673 -5.982827 8.542723 T = 4
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Figure1. Breusch and Pagan Tests
Figure 2. Hausman Test
